This PR adds diagnostic logging around ambient (cloud-provided) access token expiration when generating the Command OAuth configuration, and extends the Helm chart to optionally set a pod priorityClassName, alongside documentation/changelog updates.

Changes:

• Log the exp claim (when present) from ambient access tokens during server config creation.
• Add priorityClassName to the Helm chart values and render it into the Deployment pod spec when set.
• Update chart documentation, contributing guide structure, and bump the changelog to v2.6.1.

• Files reviewed: 6/6 changed files
• Comments generated: 1
• Review effort level: Lite

Suppressed comments (3)

internal/command/client.go:168

• This comment references newAzureDefaultCredentialSource, but that function no longer exists after the refactor, so it's misleading/outdated.

	// Fail fast if the credentials/scopes are wrong, same as
	// newAzureDefaultCredentialSource does today.
	if _, err := src.Token(); err != nil {

internal/command/client.go:243

• This comment uses second-person phrasing ("your") and references newAzureDefaultCredentialSource, which doesn't exist anymore; please reword to be accurate and impersonal.

	// Fail fast if the credentials/scopes are wrong, same as your
	// newAzureDefaultCredentialSource does today.
	if _, err := src.Token(); err != nil {

internal/command/client.go:239

• Same caching issue as Azure: this source is stored inside a cached client, so capturing a cancelable reconcile ctx can make future token refreshes fail. Strip cancellation before storing ctx.

	src := &gcpTokenSource{
		ctx:      ctx,
		audience: audience,
		scopes:   scopes,
	}

• Files reviewed: 8/9 changed files
• Comments generated: 4
• Review effort level: Lite

Suppressed comments (6)

Previously missed (3) — in code that hasn't changed since the last review.

internal/command/client.go:124

• This stores the full Azure access token string in-memory in a.last just to detect rotation, which unnecessarily retains a secret. Prefer tracking a non-secret value (e.g., the expiry timestamp) for rotation detection.

This issue also appears on line 215 of the same file.
internal/command/client.go:132

• JWT claim logging is emitted at Info level, which can leak identity details (e.g., oid/email/appid) into normal logs. Consider moving this block to a verbose logger (e.g., V(1)+) so it’s only shown when explicitly enabled.

This issue also appears on line 224 of the same file.
CHANGELOG.md:4

• The PR description focuses on ambient credential expiration/refresh, but the v2.6.1 changelog entry doesn’t mention that behavior change. Adding a brief feature bullet will help users understand why this release is needed.

internal/command/client.go:227

• JWT claim logging is emitted at Info level, which can leak identity details (e.g., email/sub) into normal logs. Consider moving this block to a verbose logger (e.g., V(1)+) so it’s only shown when explicitly enabled.

		log.Info("==== BEGIN DEBUG: Default Google ID Token JWT ======")
		printClaims(log, token.AccessToken, []string{"aud", "iss", "sub", "email"})
		log.Info("==== END DEBUG:  Default Google ID Token JWT ======")
		g.claimsShown = true

internal/command/client.go:218

• This stores the full GCP ID token string in-memory in g.last just to detect rotation, which unnecessarily retains a secret. Prefer tracking a non-secret value (e.g., the expiry timestamp) for rotation detection.

	if token.AccessToken != g.last {
		log.Info(fmt.Sprintf("Access token issued from GCP. Token expires at UTC time %s", token.Expiry.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)))
		g.last = token.AccessToken
	}

internal/command/client.go:146

• New ambient token source behavior (refreshable oauth2.TokenSource, rotation/claims logging) is not covered by unit tests, even though internal/command already has tests. Consider adding tests using a fake azcore.TokenCredential and a fake oauth2.TokenSource to verify rotation detection and one-time claim logging without requiring real cloud credentials.

func newAzureTokenSource(ctx context.Context, scopes []string) (oauth2.TokenSource, error) {
	log := log.FromContext(ctx)
	log.Info("creating new Azure Default Token Source")

• Files reviewed: 8/9 changed files
• Comments generated: 1
• Review effort level: Lite

Suppressed comments (4)

Previously missed (2) — in code that hasn't changed since the last review.

internal/command/client.go:238

• Because g.ctx was created with context.WithoutCancel, the ID-token source used here has no cancellation or deadline for future inner.Token() calls. The 10-second timeout above only covers FindDefaultCredentials; a hung GCP metadata/IAM exchange can therefore block signer initialization and later refreshes indefinitely while holding g.mu, stalling requests. Please use a bounded HTTP/context strategy for the ID-token refreshes as well.
  CHANGELOG.md:3
• The v2.6.1 notes document the chart and contributor-guide changes, but omit the user-visible ambient-auth change implemented here: Azure/GCP credentials are now supplied through a refreshing external token source instead of a one-time access token. Please add that feature to the release notes so they match the shipped authentication behavior.

internal/command/client.go:103

• The new ambient path is not covered by the existing tests: TestNewServerConfig only exercises basic/OAuth configurations, and there are no tests for either token source's refresh/rotation or Azure-to-GCP fallback. Add deterministic credential/token-source tests (including an expired token followed by a rotated token) so the expiration behavior introduced here is protected from regressions.

func (a *azureTokenSource) Token() (*oauth2.Token, error) {

internal/command/command.go:226

• This PR's main behavior change is the long-lived rotating ambient oauth2.TokenSource, but the command tests only cover direct-auth configuration and claim parsing; there is no coverage for Azure/GCP Token() returning Expiry or propagating a rotated token through the external-token configuration. Add fake credential/token-source tests for the refresh and expiry paths before relying on this authentication flow.

			WithExternalTokenSource(source).

• Files reviewed: 8/9 changed files
• Comments generated: 0 new
• Review effort level: Lite

Suppressed comments (1)

internal/command/command.go:212

• On a GCP-only deployment, this creates a fresh Azure source and performs its failed Token() probe for every distinct ambient configuration; the probe can consume the 10-second timeout in azureTokenSource.Token. ClientCache holds its write lock while newInternalSigner runs, so multiple issuers serialize these probes and can delay creation of every subsequent client. Cache provider availability/credential construction separately (while keeping scopes/audience per client), or otherwise avoid re-probing Azure for each cached client.

		source, err := newAzureTokenSource(ctx, config.AmbientCredentialScopes)

• Files reviewed: 4/5 changed files
• Comments generated: 2
• Review effort level: Lite